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Abstract
Many studies have examined the direct relationship between the two corporate prac-
tices: corporate social responsibility (CSR) and earnings management (EM); however,
the results remain heterogeneous. To achieve the consensus, this study builds upon
the classical agency theory and examines the role of managerial entrenchment in cre-
ating organizational facades related to CSR and EM. More specifically, it examines
the relationship between CSR performance and EM in the presence of managerial
entrenchment and the direct effect of managerial entrenchment on CSR decoupling.
In doing so, this article provides evidence of a previously underappreciated yet fun-
damentally important aspect, that is, managerial entrenchment, that may significantly
affect the quality of earnings as well as the level of alignment between CSR disclo-
sure and performance. Our analyses of longitudinal data of an international sample
for the period of 2007–2016 supports that managerial entrenchment significantly
moderates the relationship between CSR performance and EM. Furthermore, our
study reveals that entrenched managers decouple CSR disclosure and performance.
K E YWORD S
accrual-based earnings management, corporate social responsibility decoupling, managerial
entrenchment, nonfinancial disclosure, real earnings management
1 | INTRODUCTION
The central idea of this article is to understand the relationship
between the existence of managerial entrenchment and various cor-
porate strategies concerning the transparency of financial and non-
financial disclosure. Managerial entrenchment is a phenomenon that
can be understood as a managerial power to expropriate wealth
(Florackis & Ozkan, 2009). It is a form of agency conflict between
shareholders and managers. In the face of ineffective monitoring
mechanisms and availability of opportunities, managers may follow
their interests at the expense of investors. They seek to meet personal
objectives to preserve their job and avoid the scrutiny of stakeholders
rather than achieve corporate goals (Cespa & Cestone, 2007). Based
on the agency theory, this study examines the effects of managerial
entrenchment on two firm's (un)ethical practices: earnings manage-
ment (EM) and corporate social responsibility (CSR).
EM is an alteration of accounting numbers to “mislead stake-
holders about the underlying economics that depend on reported
accounting numbers” (Healy & Wahlen, 1999, p. 368). CSR, on the
other hand, is a firm's “obligation to constituent groups in society
other than stockholders” (Jones, 1980, p. 59). Firms respond to soci-
ety by performing internal and external CSR actions (Hawn & Ioannou,
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2016). In other words, they may bring internal changes and engage in
initiatives to improve their CSR performance and also disclose the
same to external stakeholders at the same time.1 However, the two
actions may not always align and managers may intentionally discon-
nect CSR disclosure and performance, which is referred to as CSR gap
or CSR decoupling (Tashman, Marano, & Kostova, 2019). We argue
that manipulation of earnings and the CSR gap, both are unethical,
and may give a room to entrenched managers to act in their best
interests. Based on this proposition, we aim to study the direct and
moderating effect of managerial entrenchment on these practices.
Specifically, we examine the relationship between CSR performance
and EM, the moderating impact of managerial entrenchment on this
relationship, and finally, the relationship between managerial
entrenchment and CSR decoupling.
From the financial transparency perspective, we argue that mana-
gerial entrenchment promotes a positive association between CSR per-
formance and EM. Although manipulation of earnings is an unethical
behavior (Scholtens & Kang, 2013), managers, in practice, have strong
motives for EM to meet or beat the market expectations. The research
concerning EM determinants, in general, (Bilal & Komal, 2018; García-
Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009; Lin & Hwang, 2010) and CSR perfor-
mance as a determinant of EM, in particular, has gained a tremendous
scholarly attention during the last couple of decades (see, e.g., Chen,
Gotti, Kang, & Wolfe, 2018; Chih, Shen, & Kang, 2008; Gao &
Zhang, 2015; Hong & Andersen, 2011; Kim, Park, & Wier, 2012; Liu,
Shi, Wilson, & Wu, 2017; Prior, Surroca, & Tribó, 2008). However, the
consensus related to the nature of the relationship between CSR and
EM has not been achieved. While some researchers report a negative
association (see, e.g., Grougiou, Leventis, Dedoulis, & Owusu-Ansah,
2014; Martínez-Ferrero, Banerjee, & García-Sánchez, 2016), others note
opposite results (see, e.g., Kim et al., 2012; Hong & Andersen, 2011; Liu
et al., 2017). On these lines, Liu et al. (2017) indicate that assuming a
direct relationship between the two could be misleading. On the other
hand, Florackis and Ozkan (2009) mention that entrenched managers in
firms with weak governance tend to use suboptimal strategies, for
instance, EM. The literature also suggests that these managers exten-
sively engage in CSR activities to handle stakeholder pressure
(Surroca & Tribó, 2008; Villarón-Peramato, Martínez-Ferrero, & García-
Sánchez, 2018). It gives a hint that managerial entrenchment is a rele-
vant factor that can play a critical role and explain the conflicting results
of CSR performance-EM relationship. Therefore, this study analyzes the
moderating effect of managerial entrenchment on the link.
Moreover, recent literature shows that with increased awareness
among stakeholders, modern managers face conflicting societal and
financial market demands to be profitable as well as ethical and law-
abiding (Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2016; Vansant, 2016). To meet con-
tradictory expectations, managers often tend to cuckold stakeholders
(Crilly, Zollo, & Hansen, 2012; Jensen, 2004) and create organizational
facades. Organizational facades are a “symbolic front erected by orga-
nizational participants designed to reassure their organizational stake-
holders of the legitimacy of the organization and its management”
(Abrahamson & Baumard, 2008, p. 437). Limited shareholders' rights
to influence the strategic managerial decision facilitate managers to
create such façades (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009). EM is one of
the organizational façades used by entrenched managers to misrepre-
sent financial performance. Prominent literature also acknowledges
that stakeholders use CSR performance information to assess the
financial reporting quality (Wang, Cao, & Ye, 2016) that motivates
entrenched managers to use CSR as a means to mask their irresponsi-
ble activities like EM (Gond, Palazzo, & Basu, 2009; Grougiou et al.,
2014; Prior et al., 2008). It allows entrenched managers an opportu-
nity to invest more in CSR to camouflage their unethical practices or
create CSR-related organizational facades (Cho, Laine, Roberts, &
Rodrigue, 2015) by decoupling CSR disclosure and performance.
Thus, it is pertinent to study the role of managerial entrenchment
not only in explaining the CSR performance-EM relationship but also
in creating CSR decoupling. The empirical literature, however, does
not examine this role. This article fills this void and adopts a more
nuanced approach to provide fact-based evidence about the moderat-
ing and direct role of managerial entrenchment. We further contribute
to the literature by examining CSR performance and EM link under
the different levels of managerial entrenchment.
More specifically, we investigate whether the EM of firms with high
levels of CSR performance and less managerial entrenchment is lower
than those with low levels of CSR performance and high managerial
entrenchment. Our analysis of longitudinal data of large listed compa-
nies for a period of 2007–2016 confirms that, on the one hand,
entrenched managers opportunistically invest in CSR to camouflage
their EM strategies and, on the other hand, they create a gap between
actual CSR disclosure and CSR performance. We also note that the gap
is positively and significantly linked to the various measures of EM.
Our study is novel in the sense that it identifies one of the causes of
heterogeneity and hence contributes to the existing CSR-EM literature
(Chen et al., 2018; Chih et al., 2008; Gao & Zhang, 2015; Hong & Ander-
sen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2017; Prior et al., 2008). Our study
validates the concept of internal and external CSR actions in line with
Hawn and Ioannou (2016) and suggests that weak governance increases
the gap between the two actions. We also contribute to the literature of
organizational facades (Cho et al., 2015) and study the link between two
forms of organizational facades, that is, CSR decoupling and EM. By
doing so, we extend the recent work on the CSR gap (see, Sauerwald &
Su, 2019; Tashman et al. 2019). We reveal that firms decouple CSR
actions to camouflage other hypocritical strategies.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: The next
section discusses the fragmentation in the existing literature, provides
theoretical underpinnings, and presents the hypotheses. We describe
the research method and data in the third section, include the results
and its discussion in the fourth section, and conclude our study in the
fifth section.
2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Classical agency theory literature supports affective corporate moni-
toring to avoid wealth expropriation by the managers (Florackis &
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Ozkan, 2009). Agency scholars agree that managerial entrenchment is
a function of weak governance. Weak governance gives room to man-
agers to prioritize their personal goals over the goals of the firm
(Bebchuk et al., 2009). On the other hand, it is also linked with low-
quality financial reporting practices (Klein, 2002). It shows that there
is a relationship between managerial entrenchment and EM (Zhao &
Chen, 2008). The basic premise of this stream of literature is that
entrenched managers avoid difficult decisions and costly efforts.
Therefore, they try to conceal their inefficient management of a strat-
egy or improperly reaped private benefits. We argue in this article that
besides manipulation of earning numbers (Zhao & Chen, 2008), CSR
can also serve as a concealer.
Similarly, stakeholder theory also discourages the managerial
opportunism and misrepresentation of financial and nonfinancial per-
formance. In this respect, Qian, Gao, and Tsang (2015) and Kim et al.
(2012) argue that any socially unacceptable strategies, including EM,
can seriously harm a firm's relationship with its stakeholders. Like the
stakeholder theory, agency theory posits that manipulation of earn-
ings is an act of deception about the actual financial performance of
the firm and causes agency problems among managers and share-
holders (Scholtens & Kang, 2013). On the other hand, Hussain, Rigoni,
and Orij (2018) argue that real CSR engagement can reduce agency
conflicts. Similarly, the delineation provided by Carroll (1979) about
socially responsible firms suggests that firms should be profitable, but
ethical, law-abiding, and good corporate citizens at the same time.
Although firms have a responsibility to undertake social or envi-
ronmental initiatives to take care of shareholders as well as non-
shareholding stakeholders, they can use CSR as a masking tool (Prior
et al., 2008). Hawn and Ioannou (2016) point out that firms perform
two types of CSR actions: internal CSR actions reflect a firm's adop-
tion of CSR-related policies or practices while external CSR actions
reflect a firm's communication or reporting behavior. CSR perfor-
mance is an example of internal actions and is the “measurement of
how socially responsible a firm behaves and what CSR activities a firm
undertakes (Hinze & Sump, 2019, p. 128). Whereas CSR disclosure is
an example of external actions, and it communicates a firm's CSR per-
formance to various stakeholders to gain visibility. Since both CSR
performance and disclosure can generate legitimacy (Hawn &
Ioannou, 2016), they are potent means for managers to pursue their
personal goals. It is more apparent with a recent debate on CSR
decoupling (Sauerwald & Su, 2019; Tashman et al., 2019).
Under similar assumptions, Christensen, Morsing, and Thyssen
(2013) and Pope and Wæraas (2016) argue that if a firm demonstrates an
enhanced engagement in CSR, its claims can elevate the stakeholders'
expectations and resultantly mount the pressure to be responsible in
other corporate practices. Likewise, Bertels and Peloza (2008) maintain
that CSR performance can increase the multitude of pressure by
attracting pressure groups' attention toward a firm's policies and prac-
tices. If entrenched managers invest more in the CSR activities to mask
unethical practices (Prior et al., 2008), then the firm can lose its legitimacy
in the financial market. Recently, Hawn and Ioannou (2016) note that
firms that promote ethical behavior only symbolically have a lower mar-
ket value than the firms with a minimum or no gap between their
disclosure and performance. The theories discussed above discourage
opportunistic behavior of managers and the devious use of CSR as well
as EM (Kim et al., 2012). In line with the agency perspective, we argue
that true CSR engagement is negatively linked with EM. However,
entrenched managers may use CSR as a masking tool for hiding their
unethical reporting behavior. Moreover, we expect that managerial
entrenchment may also affect nonfinancial disclosure transparency.
2.1 | Corporate social responsibility and earnings
quality2
The research in the CSR-EM nexus has recently received considerable
attention in the accounting and management fields. One prominent
research strand suggests that firms with high levels of CSR commitment
behave more ethically than those with low levels of CSR commitment
(Gao & Zhang, 2015; Hong & Andersen, 2011). Likewise, Chen et al.
(2018) and Wang et al. (2016) note that responsible companies con-
strain their use of corporate EM strategies, thereby delivering a higher
earnings quality (EQ) in their financial reports. On the other hand, there
is also burgeoning literature that shows a negative link between CSR
and EQ (Grougiou et al., 2014; Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2016). The later
strand shows that companies with a lower level of EQ often exhibit
higher levels of CSR disclosure, voicing that firms opportunistically use
CSR as a tool to change the perceptions of investors while engaging in
EM in reality. Kim et al. (2012), however, promote the first view and
argue that it is unethical when managers invest in CSR to conceal their
EM strategies. They further point out that deceiving shareholders or
nonshareholding stakeholders is against the virtues of corporate citizen-
ship. In line with Kim and colleagues, many others support a positive
relationship (see, for example, Hong & Andersen, 2011; Liu et al., 2017).
The review of existing literature shows that there is an apparent
competition among these two schools. Liu et al. (2017), in this regard,
suggest that researchers in this field should consider factors that can
better explain the nature of the relationship between the two corpo-
rate practices. Keeping in view that very little is known about factors
that affect the CSR and EQ relationship and based on our discussion
on the relevancy of managerial entrenchment to study firms' CSR and
EM practices (see, for example, Florackis & Ozkan, 2009; Surroca &
Tribó, 2008; Villarón-Peramato et al., 2018; Zhao & Chen, 2008), this
paper examines its moderating role in achieving the consensus.
2.2 | Managerial entrenchment, corporate social
responsibility performance, and earnings quality
The literature to date has ignored the fundamental managerial aspect
that can explain the relationship between CSR performance and
EQ. A recent study by Walker (2013) provides a comprehensive
review of existing literature that highlights various managerial incen-
tives to manage earnings. However, the pursuit of these managerial
objectives can lead to extremely negative results for managers as well
as for the firm (Guan, Wright, & Leikam, 2005). To avoid such negative
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consequences, entrenched managers—those who expropriate wealth
from the shareholders by pursuing their personal objectives but pre-
serving their job position at the same time—use CSR to create a
smokescreen (Cespa & Cestone, 2007). Despite the continuous efforts
to minimize managerial discretion over reporting, modern-day
reporting practices offer entrenched managers many opportunities to
manipulate financial (Di Meo, Lara, & Surroca, 2017) and nonfinancial
information (Cho et al., 2015). On the one hand, managers may
engage in EM, and on the other hand, they may invest extensively in
CSR to disguise their acts (Cumming, Hou, & Lee, 2016).
When managers are unable to generate sufficient shareholder
value, they adopt other strategies to deter the threat of hostile take-
over. Masking the actual firm performance by manipulating earnings
has its incentives given that the participants in the capital market often
rely on such information (Di Meo et al., 2017). Similarly, stakeholder sat-
isfaction is also essential. The lack of support from stakeholders can
increase the chances of a hostile takeover (Schneper & Guillén, 2004)
and dismissal or replacement of CEOs (Surroca & Tribó, 2008). In this
situation, managers adopt some powerful entrenchment strategies by
establishing a friendly behavior or colluding with stakeholders (Cespa &
Cestone, 2007). The objective is to gain stakeholders' support for
channeling their efforts to the manager's advantage. Besides this, stake-
holders can exercise their power via boards when the board has a
stakeholder representation (Kock, Santaló, & Diestre, 2012).
A manager who is entrenched needs to protect himself from pow-
erful stakeholders. Adopting a stakeholder-oriented behavior helps a
firm in gaining legitimacy and stakeholder satisfaction. The motivation
to increase stakeholder support and build a friendly relationship
encourages these managers to engage in different social and environ-
mental activities (Surroca & Tribó, 2008). Therefore, the CSR initia-
tives serve as a defensive and legitimacy tool as it helps the firm avoid
adverse reactions of stakeholders who are affected by EM practices
(Prior et al., 2008). It enables entrenched managers to pursue their
own goals (cf., Surroca, Tribó, & Waddock, 2010). Keeping in view
these facts, we assume that managerial entrenchment has a moderat-
ing role and can help improve the collective understanding of the
CSR–EQ relationship. Therefore, we test the CSR performance and
EM link in the presence of managerial entrenchment. Moreover, we
consider both types of EM, namely accrual-based and real EM. Hence,
we propose the following testable hypotheses:
H1 With managerial entrenchment taken into consideration, CSR perfor-
mance is positively related to accrual-based earnings management.
H2 With managerial entrenchment taken into consideration, CSR perfor-
mance is positively related to real earnings management.
2.3 | Managerial entrenchment and CSR
decoupling
The institutional approach suggests that firms in the same institutional
environment should behave in a similar manner (Reid & Toffel, 2009).
However, in practice, this does not hold. Firms operating in the same
industry behave differently, especially in terms of CSR issues
(Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009). While some may respond symboli-
cally, others may respond substantively to the CSR requirements
(Marquis & Toffel, 2011). The firm's internal factors, like managerial
characteristics, could lead firms to different strategies and actions.
Top executives or influential CEOs, in particular, play a central role in
any firm's CSR decisions (Walls & Berrone, 2017).
Managers become entrenched when they are powerful. They may
gain this power because of their dual roles as CEOs and chairperson
(Jackling & Johl, 2009), long tenure, share ownership (Veprauskaite &
Adams, 2013), or status as founders (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988).
According to the agency perspective, entrenched forms of CEO power
may be used to advance self-interests rather than the interests of
shareholders or stakeholders (Weisbach, 1988). Powerful entrenched
CEOs may inhibit boards monitoring ability and influence boards' stra-
tegic decisions like an investment in CSR (Muttakin, Khan, & Mihret,
2018). The CSR engagement becomes part of their plan only if it helps
them to gain economic benefits.
CSR investments are costly (Goss & Roberts, 2011) and have a
long-term return horizon (Brooks & Oikonomou, 2018; Qiu, Shaukat, &
Tharyan, 2016). The nonstockholding stakeholders mostly require
firms to be ethically, socially, and environmentally responsible, which
means managers have to direct critical resources toward long-term
investments. Entrenched managers do not want to invest in CSR, yet
meet the stakeholder needs at the same time. The possible reason
could be to gain a personal reputation among stakeholders. To keep
their self-service activities undercover, they have to symbolically
show that the firm seriously takes up CSR issues (Villarón-Peramato
et al., 2018). Furthermore, the absence of short term profitability
associated with CSR investments motivates managers who are inter-
ested in immediate ROI to decouple internal and external CSR actions
or in other words, to create a gap between CSR disclosure and perfor-
mance (Sauerwald & Su, 2019; Tashman et al., 2019).
CSR reports, given its advantages, can represent as a symbolic
form of CSR (Hawn & Ioannou, 2016). To gain legitimacy and create a
desirable self-image among stakeholders, managers may misrepresent
CSR performance in their CSR reports or misalign performance and
disclosure. The easiest way to maintain short-termism and gain legiti-
macy is by overstating the nonfinancial performance (Mahoney,
Thorne, Cecil, & LaGore, 2013), which creates a positive gap between
disclosure and performance (Graafland & Smid, 2019). This situation is
a cause of information asymmetry between the firm and stakeholders.
The market reacts by penalizing such a firm as a hypocritical firm. In
the process of decoupling CSR, managers not only fake the CSR per-
formance (Crilly et al., 2012), but also sometimes understate the CSR
performance in reports. Understatement creates a negative gap
between disclosure and performance. Hawn and Ioannou (2016) point
out various reasons for such behavior such as a firm is risk-averse and
is not sure about the reaction of the market, has a policy of secrecy, is
in the process of experimentation, and does not want to get the
attention of other stakeholders and social movements, and so
on. Whatever the reason is, financial markets and investors do not
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fully acknowledge a firm's CSR efforts in the absence of sufficient
CSR information. They are less likely to reward the firm (Hawn &
Ioannou, 2016). This shows that the CSR gap, whether positive or
negative, is harmful to the firm.
Minor and Morgan (2011) show that CSR engagement has an
insurance like effect. In the face of contrasting stakeholders' demands,
this effect can be rewarding. It provides entrenched managers with an
opportunity to misalign CSR disclosure and performance and to hide
their unethical reporting behavior. In a nutshell, entrenched managers
are involved not only in manipulating earnings numbers but also in
creating another type of organizational façade, that is, the CSR gap.
Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H3 Keeping other things constant, managerial entrenchment is positively
associated with the gap between CSR disclosure and CSR
performance.
3 | METHODOLOGY AND DATA
3.1 | Sample
We collected data from Thomson Reuters Eikon for a period of
10 years from 2007 to 2016 for all nonfinancial firms from America,
Europe, the Middle East, Africa (EMEA), and Asia. The data is com-
prised of 3,594 companies from 31 stock indices. After excluding
observations with missing financial, economic, and CSR information,
we used a final sample of 9,746 firm-year observations for the analy-
sis. Our study sample is composed of firms from 28 different coun-
tries: Australia, Belgium, Bermuda, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Macau, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New
Guinea, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Regarding the geographi-
cal distribution of the sample, the observations are not distributed
homogeneously: 35.79% of the companies are from the USA, 12.58%
Canada, 10.13% from Australia, and 9.38% from Japan, being the
most representative countries of the sample. The rest of the observa-
tions are distributed more homogeneously among the rest of the
countries analyzed.
3.2 | Measures
3.2.1 | Earnings management
In our study, we focus on both types of EM strategies that entrenched
managers may use to meet or beat earnings' benchmarks. Managers
can choose between accrual-based EM (AEM) and real EM (REM).
According to Zang (2012), decisions to manage earnings through “real”
actions precede those to manage earnings through accruals. Conven-
tionally, studies have focused more on AEM because it is less costly in
terms of negative effects and thus is preferred, whereas REM could
be harmful to long-term competitiveness and future value (García-
Osma, 2008). However, REM is also prevalent in practice (Graham,
Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005) as it cannot be easily detected (Cohen &
Zarowin, 2010).
3.2.2 | Accruals earnings management (AEM)
According to the accounting literature, the component of an accrual
adjustment that is discretionary should represent the management
discretion, and therefore earnings manipulation. This measure was
first introduced by Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1988), although the
study by Jones (1991) represented a landmark in this line of research.
For our analysis, we adapted Jones' proposed model. Consistent with
Prior et al. (2008), all models include dummy variables identifying the
country of origin, because the sample size precludes estimating
models by year, sector, and country.
Jones (1991) proposed that the components of accrual adjust-
ments should be separated using a linear regression model. This model
accounted for the total adjustment in terms of two variables: the
change in sales and gross fixed assets. Subsequently, DeFond and
Jiambalvo (1994) corrected the main drawback of the standard Jones
model related to its use of time series and the need for a large number
of observations per firm. They propose that the model should be
obtained using annual cross-sectional data, grouping firms by sectors.
Methodologically, we follow Jones (1991) and Dechow, Sloan, and
Sweeney (1995). According to the modified Jones model, this study
uses the change in sales minus accounts receivable (to capture the
growth of the company, as working capital is linked to sales), less
property, plant and equipment, as a measure of depreciation costs










In the above Model 1, A*R is a measure of accounts receivable; Ai,
t − 1 is firm i's total assets at the end of year t − 1, Salesit represents
sales during year t for firm i; PPEit represents property, plant, and
equipment during year t for firm i, and εt is the error term. In the
above model, the coefficients are calculated using the original Jones
model (1991) and the modification is used only for the calculation of
the nondiscretionary adjustments. In line with previous studies in the
field of accounting, we calculate “AEM” as the absolute value of dis-
cretionary accruals. For robustness checks and better insights, we also
use positive as well as negative discretionary accruals, that is,
“Positive_AEM” and “Negative_AEM”.
3.2.3 | Real earnings management (REM)
In addition to AEM, firms manipulate real earnings as an alternative
to AEM. Therefore, AEM and REM are substitutes, and either one
can be used as a measure of manipulative behavior (Kim et al., 2012).
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We follow Roychowdhury (2006) to estimates discretionary expen-
diture (advertising, R&D, and SG&A), abnormal levels of cash flows
from operations, and production costs. Originally Dechow, Kothari,
and Watts (1998) presented these models and had been widely used
in accounting literature (see, for instance, Kim et al., 2012; Chen,
Lin, & Lin, 2008; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). We estimate the normal











In Model 2, OCFit represents firm i's operating cash flows for firm
i in year t, determined by summing the net income, depreciation and
amortization, and changes in current liabilities, minus changes in cur-
rent assets; ΔSalesit is firm i's change in sales between year t − 1 and
year t; and the other variables are as defined in Model 1. The abnor-
mal OCF is obtained as the residual from Model 2.









In the above Model 3, DISEXPit represents the discretionary
expenditure of firm i in the current year. Abnormal discretionary
expenditure is calculated as the difference between the actual values
DISEXPit
Ai,t−1






























where PRODCOSTSit is a measure of firm i's production costs in year t,
calculated as COGSit + ΔINVit, where COGSit + ΔINVit is firm i's cost of
goods sold in year t and ΔINVit is firm i's change in inventories; the
residual from Model 4 represents the abnormal production costs.
As proposed by Zang (2012), we combine these three measures
into a comprehensive aggregate metrics of “REM.” To do this, we mul-
tiply the abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretion-
ary expenses by minus one and aggregate these into a single measure.
Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we do not multiply the abnor-
mal production costs by minus one because higher production costs,
as noted earlier, are indicative of over-production to reduce the cost
of goods sold. The higher the value of this measure, the more likely
the firm is to engage in sales manipulation and reduction of discretion-
ary expenditure to boost reported earnings.
REMit = −AbnOCFitð Þ+ −AbnDISEXPitð Þ+AbnPRODCOSTSit ð5Þ
3.2.4 | CSR performance
CSR performance was drawn from the ASSET4 database by using the
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) score (Muñoz-Torres,
Fernández-Izquierdo, Rivera-Lirio, & Escrig-Olmedo, 2019; Wang,
Hsieh, & Sarkis, 2018). ESG scores are designed to transparently and
objectively measure a company's relative ESG performance, commit-
ment, and effectiveness across various themes (emissions, environ-
mental product innovation, human rights, shareholders, etc.) based on
company-reported data. The ten main themes assessed to construct
the ESG score are the following: (1) resource use score; (2) emissions
score; (3) innovation score; (4) workforce score; (5) human rights
score; (6) community score; (7) product responsibility score; (8) man-
agement score; (9) shareholders score; and (10) CSR strategy. Each
theme is scored between 0 and 10; thus, “ESG” is in the range 0–100
and represents the CSR performance; higher scores indicate greater
CSR achievements (Muñoz-Torres et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2018).
Instead of using only the ES score, a global assessment of ESG score
allows investors, analysts, and other stakeholders to evaluate how
well firms are committed to CSR issues. As Wang et al. (2018) suggest,
ESG provides a more comprehensive evaluation of CSR achievements
rather than those scores focused only on social or environmental
issues.
3.2.5 | CSR gap
For the operationalization of the CSR gap, we follow Hawn and
Ioannou (2016)4 and calculate the CSR gap measure as an absolute
difference between the external and internal CSR actions. In our sam-
ple, some firms do have a negative gap between internal and external
actions. The negative gap shows that some firms are performing bet-
ter than they actually disclose. By using this construction of the
decoupling indicator, we contribute toward studies like Luo, Wang,
and Zhang (2017), who relied on the quality of CSR reporting for cap-
turing the symbolic involvement with CSR.
3.2.6 | Managerial entrenchment
Following Bebchuk et al. (2009), we created an entrenchment index
as the aggregate of six entrenchment provisions and termed as
“Entrenchment”. Each provision is measured on a binary scale. For the
existence of provision, it takes value 1 and 0 otherwise. Accordingly,
each firm in each year will have an entrenchment index score between
0 and 6. The six provisions are a measure of limiting shareholder rights
and providing managers more and more discretion to make strategic
decisions (Collins & Huang, 2011). The provisions are (a) staggered
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board: a board in which directors are divided into separate classes
(typically three) with each class being elected to overlapping terms;
(b) limitation on amending by laws: a provision limiting shareholders'
ability through majority vote to amend the corporate by laws;
(c) limitation on amending the charter: a provision limiting share-
holders' ability through majority vote to amend the corporate charter;
(d) supermajority to approve a merger: a requirement that requires
more than a majority of shareholders to approve a merger; (e) golden
parachute: a severance agreement that provides benefits to manage-
ment/board members in the event of firing, demotion, or resignation
following a change in control; and (f ) poison pill: a shareholder right
that is triggered in the event of an unauthorized change in control that
typically renders the target company financially unattractive or dilutes
the voting power of the acquirer.
Research on governance and EM as well as CSR shows that effec-
tive governance, on the one hand, improves financial reporting trans-
parency (García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009) and, on the other
hand, promotes CSR performance (Hussain et al., 2018). Keeping in
view the existing evidence, we use the entrenchment index as an
inverse proxy of governance effectiveness. We argue that a higher
index score indicates ineffective governance and more managerial
autonomy to misuse organizational resources.
3.2.7 | Control variables
To control for confounding factors, we included a set of control vari-
ables in the regression models. The selection of controls is in line with
Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, and Yang (2012) and is based on firm
and institutional-level factors. We included the following firm-level
indicators: “Size” measured as the natural logarithm of total assets;
“ROA” measured as the return-on-assets ratio; “Market_cap” mea-
sured as the market to book ratio; “Leverage” measured as the total
debt divided by total assets; “Analysts” measured as the number of
financial analysts that follow a firm by year; and “WC,” measured as
the value of the difference between current assets and current
liabilities.
Given that we have an international sample, we also include
several institutional-level controls. We define four variables,
“Culture”, “STAKELAW”, “CSRLAW”, and “Enforcement” following
Garcia-Sanchez, Cuadrado-Ballesteros, and Frias-Aceituno (2016).
“Culture” represents the cultural system development as the mean
score of the six cultural dimensions proposed by Hofstede.5
“STAKELAW” and “CSRLAW” are two proxies developed by
Dhaliwal et al. (2012) to represent stakeholder orientation. The first
variable assesses the legal environment of a country concerning the
protection of labor rights and benefits. “STAKELAW” is the average
score of four indices obtained from Botero, Djankov, Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004). The “Enforcement” index captures
the quality of the legal tradition (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). It is formed by the mean value of two indi-
ces that are factors of shareholders and stakeholders' rights: (a) law
and order and (b) efficiency of the judicial system. Finally, to control
for variation across country, time, and industry, we include country,
year, and industry dummies.
4 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 | Descriptive results
We apply various panel data regression models, with the decision
regarding which analytic technique to be used depends on the nature
of the dependent variable and the type of function that is proposed to
relate X and Y. In this research, the dynamic panel estimator proposed
by Arellano and Bond (1991), based on the generalized method of
moments (GMM) introduced by Hansen (1982), is employed. Table 1
reports descriptive statistics and correlations for all the analyzed vari-
ables except the industry and year dummies. The main variables,
“AEM” and “REM” show mean values of 0.21 and −0.06, respectively.
The “ESG” is around 62 points of a possible range of 0–100, indicating
that, on average, firms are committed toward CSR. The mean value of
the CSR gap is above 0, which shows, on average, firms misalign CSR
disclosure and performance. Regarding the control variables, for
example, sample firms, on average, have a return on equity ratio
around 2.4% and are followed by 16 financial analysts. Table 1 also
reports the frequency of “Entrenchment” index values. We observe
that few companies take values 5 and 6 for the entrenchment index
which are associated with a golden parachute and poison pill
(Bebchuk et al., 2009). These provisions are often used by firms to
limit the shareholders' ability to affect the managerial discretion on
strategic decisions. Panel B of the table reports the correlation matrix
that shows a low or moderate correlation among variables. We do not
find any high correlation coefficients between dependent and inde-
pendent variables or between independent variables.
4.2 | Test of hypotheses
In this section, we present the results of all regression models. The
results in Tables 2 and 3 confirm the moderating effect of managerial
entrenchment on the relationship between CSR and EQ (accrual-
based and real EM, respectively). We used Stata to run the GMM
regression models. We report the coefficient and the standard error
for each explanatory variable. We also provide the results of the
Arellano–Bond test for AR (2) in the first differences and the Hansen
test of over-identification restrictions.6
Table 2 provides evidence about accrual-based EM as an inverse
proxy of EQ. In Model 6.1, the CSR performance indicator variable is
negatively associated with accrual-based EM. While the entrench-
ment index is positively and significantly associated with EM prac-
tices, highlighting the high coefficient. The interaction between CSR
performance and entrenchment “ESG*Entrenchment” is positive and
significant. Our results reveal that the relationship between CSR per-
formance and EM became positive in the presence of managerial
entrenchment. This can be compared with our earlier result of the
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negative direct relationship when managerial entrenchment was not
in the model. This confirms our H1 and implies that the managerial
entrenchment increases the manager's propensity to engage in the
instrumental use of CSR.
Our results are consistent for the alternative dependent variables
“Positive_AEM” and “Negative_AEM” in Models 6.1.1 and 6.1.2,
respectively. The findings of both models show that the CSR perfor-
mance is negatively associated with positive or negative EM, except
when CSR interacts with managerial entrenchment. Thus, we again
support the moderating effect of managerial entrenchment on the
relationship between CSR and EM.
Table 3 shows the results of the relationships between CSR per-
formance, managerial entrenchment, and real-based EM. In Model
6.2, we note that the CSR performance does not significantly explain
changes in the REM and only the entrenchment index is positively
and significantly associated with REM. Additionally, we did not
observe the moderating effect of managerial entrenchment as the
results for the relevant variable are insignificant (δ3= −6.104, p > .10).
Therefore, we are unable to support our H2.
To further our understanding regarding the relationship between
CSR and REM, we run three additional models where we use each
component of “REM” as a dependent variable, namely “AbnOCF”,
“AbnDISEXP”, and “AbnPRODCOST”. Results are similar to those pre-
viously reported for the main REM measure. Interestingly, we note
that CSR performance is negatively and significantly associated with
“AbnOCF” and “AbnDISEXP.” Therefore, in contrast to our expecta-
tions, we cannot support that the managerial entrenchment moder-
ates the impact of CSR commitment on REM.
Tables 4 and 5 provide evidence about the relationship between
managerial entrenchment and the CSR gap, as well as between the
CSR gap and EM and REM. In Model 7, the managerial entrenchment
indicator variable is positively associated with “CSR_Gap.” This result
supports our H3 and indicates that the entrenched management of
any company is more prone to decouple CSR disclosure and CSR
performance.
Additionally, in Table 4 (Model 8, 8.1, and 8.2), we further report
the results of CSR with the three manifestations of AEM as follows,
where “AEM” as the dependent variable is replaced with positive and
negative discretionary accruals. The “CSR_Gap” measure is positively
and significantly associated with the overall measure of AEM. In
terms of positive and negative accruals, we note that “CSR_Gap” is
significantly associated with both measures of AEM at 1% signifi-
cance level. In Table 5, we present the results of the relationship
between the CSR gap and REM. It also shows the results of the rela-
tionship between the CSR gap and the three components of REM:
abnormal operating cash flow (Model 9.1), discretionary expenses
(Model 9.2), and production costs (Model 9.3). The results confirm
that the CSR gap is significantly and positively associated with REM.
This further strengthens our idea of the instrumental use of CSR
investment.
As a robustness check, we break down the managerial entrench-
ment index into four categories according to the provisions used to
calculate it. Given the lower frequency of Provision 5 and 6 associated
with golden parachutes and poison pills, respectively, we merge Provi-
sion 4, 5, and 6 into one. Thus, we aim to examine the following
models in Model 10 (where AEM is the dependent variable in Model
10.1 and REM is the dependent variable in Model 10.2) and report
the results in Table 6.
The results of both models show that CSR performance is negatively
and significantly linked to AEM and REM. In addition, each of the compo-
nents of the entrenchment index shows a positive and significant impact
on AEM and REM except the “Entrenchment_3”, which is insignificant.
Interestingly, the interaction terms between “ESG” and individual
provisions of the entrenchment index show significant positive relation-
ships with accrual and real EM measures.
Our results hence support that the CSR-AEM and CSR-REM
relationships become positive when “ESG” interacts with the
entrenchment provisions; otherwise, these associations are always
negative. For instance, if we focus on those firms that have the
limitation on amending by laws—the second provision of entrench-
ment index—the previous negative direct impact of CSR perfor-
mance on AEM converts to the positive influence. Contrary to
results in Table 3, we note that the individual entrenchment provisions
provide support to the fact that increased managerial entrenchment
promotes a positive relationship between CSR performance and both
types of EM strategies.
TABLE 4 Regression analysis linking CSR gap, accrual earnings management, and managerial entrenchment
Model 7 CSR_Gap Model 8 AEM Model 8.1 Postive_AEM Model 8.2 Negative_AEM
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Main variables
Entrenchment .521*** 0.212
CSR_Gap .199*** 0.038 .351*** 0.023 .101*** 0.009
Control variables Included Included Included Included
Controlled by country, year, and industry
AR(2) Arellano-Bond test
Hansen test
Pr > z = 0.128
Prob > chi2 = 1.000
Pr > z = 0.551
Prob > chi2 = 1.000
Pr > z = 0.318
Prob > chi2 = 1.000
Pr > z = 0.143
Prob > chi2 = 1.000
Note: Sample: 9,746 observations in 2007–2016.
*, **, and, *** represent statistical significance at 90, 95, and 99%, respectively.
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Summarizing all results, we support the prior literature that argues
for a negative relationship between real CSR engagement and
EM. Hence, our results help generate consensus about the nature of
the underlying relationship. Moreover, with the managerial entrench-
ment taken into consideration, CSR performance is positively related
to accrual-based and real EM. Hence, we support the moderating role
of managerial entrenchment. We also find that managerial entrench-
ment is positively and significantly associated with the CSR gap. Fur-
thermore, the results indicate that a firm's CSR decoupling is strongly
linked to all the measures of EM. Moreover, First, in line with findings
of Kim et al. (2012), Gao and Zhang (2015), Chen et al. (2018), Liu
et al. (2017) and others; we confirm a positive relationship between
CSR performance and EQ—a negative relationship to accrual-based
EM measures. This shows that firms with high levels of CSR commit-
ment behave in an ethical manner than companies that exhibit low
levels of CSR commitment (Hong & Anderson, 2011; Gao &
Zhang, 2015).
Secondly, we support the underlying idea of Gond et al. (2009)
about the entrenched managers' use of financial and nonfinancial orga-
nizational practices instrumentally. In this vein, as Cho et al. (2015) high-
light, we report that entrenched managers opportunistically invest more
in CSR to camouflage their unethical financial reporting practices. Fur-
thermore, we find that managerial entrenchment promotes the creation
of organizational facades related to CSR. This is also in line with the
argument of Prior et al. (2008) that managers use CSR as a tool to mask
their unethical entrenchment actions. Our results further support that
the entrenched managers use CSR to create a rosy picture when they
are engaged in manipulating the earning numbers (Cespa & Cestone,
2007; Cumming et al., 2016). In this regard, results are also supported
by the positive effect of managerial entrenchment of EM (accrual-based
and real-based EM actions). Although the prior literature did not pay
much attention to managerial entrenchment as a determinant of any
EM strategy, we support that entrenchment acts as a valid driver of
accrual-based and real-based EM.
TABLE 5 Regression analysis linking CSR gap, accrual earnings management, and managerial entrenchment
Model 9 REM Model 9.1 AbnOCF Model 9.2 AbnDISEXP Model 9.3 AbnPRODCOST
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Main variables
CSR_Gap .785*** 0.201 .001** 0.000 .785*** 0.201 .001*** 0.000
Control variables Included Included Included Included
Controlled by country, year, and industry
AR(2) Arellano-Bond test
Hansen test
Pr > z = 0.148
Prob > chi2 = 0.993
Pr > z = 0.380
Prob > chi2 = 1.000
Pr > z = 0.148
Prob > chi2 = 0.993
Pr > z = 0.396
Prob > chi2 = 0.999
Note: Sample: 9,746 observations in 2007–2016.
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 90, 95, and 99%, respectively.
TABLE 6 Complementary analysis
Model 10.1 AEM Model 10.2 REM
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Main variables
ESG −4.535*** 0.936 −.705*** .231
Entrenchment_1 .446*** 0.0104 8.389*** 2.578
Entrenchment_2 .358*** 75.717 6.715*** 1.916
Entrenchment_3 .109 78.202 8.145*** 2.187
Entrenchment_4–6 .377*** 73.281 4.410** 1.910
ESG*Entrenchment_1 5.570*** 1.377 .909*** .314
ESG*Entrenchment_2 7.500*** 1.067 .751*** .245
ESG*Entrenchment_3 1.958* 1.093 .939*** .272
ESG*Entrenchment_4–6 3.908*** 0.992 .456* .241
Control variables Included Included
Controlled by country, year, and industry
AR(2) Arellano-Bond test
Hansen test
Pr > z = 0.106
Prob > chi2 = 1.000
Pr > z = 0.675
Prob > chi2 = 0.959
Note: Regression analysis linking CSR performance, earnings management, and managerial entrenchment
components. Sample: 9,746 observations in 2007–2016.
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 90, 95, and 99%, respectively.
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We also note that the moderating effect of managerial entrench-
ment on the relationship between CSR and EQ is more prevalent in
specific EM strategies. Although several authors have considered
accrual-based and real practices of EM, the results obtained in the
present study vary depending on the measure of EM taken. We do
not provide the evidence about the moderating effect of managerial
entrenchment in the combined real EM proxy except in the comple-
mentary analysis when we break down the entrenchment index into
its sub-indices. The possible reasons for the difference in results
depend on the EM strategies employed by the entrenched managers.
We find weak support for the hypothesized relationship with REM.
REM is considered costlier and detrimental to firms' competitiveness
and future value, which hinders even entrenched managers from
engaging in such manipulations (García-Osma, 2008). However, our
results concerning CSR_Gap and EM measures are robust. CSR_Gap
measure, significantly affected by the existence of managerial
entrenchment, shows a consistently positive relationship with all mea-
sures of EM. These results strengthen our basic premise that manage-
rial entrenchment is a contingent factor that affects CSR-EM
relationship.
5 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
The study aims to examine the effect of management entrenchment
on the relationship between CSR practices and EM and on the gap
between CSR disclosure and CSR performance. The analysis of the
longitudinal data of large international listed companies confirms a
negative association between CSR performance and the use of EM
strategies by firms. This suggests that firms that demonstrate high
levels of CSR commitment are less involved in manipulating their
earnings. The firms that decouple their CSR performance from CSR
disclosure are manipulating earnings more than their counterparts
whose CSR performance is aligned with CSR disclosure. Moreover,
we find strong support that managerial entrenchment is a crucial fac-
tor that affects the underlying CSR-EM relationship. It moderates the
link and increases a firm's propensity to engage in creating CSR-
related organizational facades.
Theoretically, this study contributes to the stakeholder and
legitimacy frameworks by suggesting that the engagement in the
CSR activities has a spillover effect on the ethical reporting behav-
ior of firms. This ethical behavior can help firms to achieve and
maintain legitimacy in the financial market. In the presence of weak
governance, entrenched managers mask their unethical reporting
behavior by either investing more in CSR and manipulate earnings
or by creating CSR-related facades. At the same time, they engage
heavily in managing EM. The ethical premise of the stakeholder
theory suggests that firms that are genuinely committed to CSR
should have more credible financial and nonfinancial information.
This means that firms with high levels of CSR performance are
more likely to report their earnings ethically and less opportunisti-
cally than companies that exhibit low levels of CSR performance.
We also contribute to the literature of corporate governance (see,
Bebchuk et al., 2009; García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009) by
showing that when the governance is weak, the managers have the
opportunity to use CSR practices to mask their unethical reporting
behavior. Moreover, weak governance gives birth to more entrenched
management that resultantly can use financial and nonfinancial infor-
mation for achieving their own objectives. These results can provide a
substantial input for governance regulations and hence also offer
practical implications. Based on our findings, we argue that strong
governance can make firms more transparent, ethical, and truly
responsible. When firms are heavily investing in CSR, that can serve
as an indication of the opportunistic behavior of firms. This is espe-
cially true when the quality of reported earnings is lower, governance
is weak, and managers have ample opportunities to seek personal
goals.
This research is subjected to certain limitations that can be
addressed in future research. To generalize the findings beyond the
listed firms, it is recommended that researchers test our evidence with
nonlisted and small and medium-sized companies and examine the
underlying relationships in the context of greater stakeholder or
shareholder protections, different legal systems, and cultural values,
and so forth. Another limitation is related to EM measures that ignore
the differences in the accounting standards at the country level.
Future research may examine how country-level governance and
reporting standards moderate the relationship between CSR and
EM. This study considers only the global construct of CSR. Future
studies can use individual dimensions of CSR like resource use, inno-
vation, workforce or human rights scores, etc. Finally, future research
may examine the impact of CSR on other corporate practices like tax
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ENDNOTES
1 CSR, in general, reflects both actions of a firm.
2 Following Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) and Kim et al. (2012), we
assume EM as being a negative measure of EQ, as EM through discre-
tionary accounting policies reduces the usefulness of accounting
information.
3 Similar to “AEM” models, for estimating REM measures, all models
include dummy variables identifying the country of origin, the year, and
the activity sector.
4 The operationalization provided by Hawn and Ioannou (2016) of CSR
gap is based on the absolute difference between 24 external items and
21 internal items derived from the Thomson Reuter's Asset4 score of
environmental, social, and governance matrix. We follow the same tech-
nique to calculate an absolute gap between the external and
internal actions of each firm for each year. The gap between external
and internal actions is the absolute value of the difference
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CSR_GAPit = Externalit – Internalit – 1, accounting for the misalignment
in both types of actions.
5 To construct the measure of "Culture", we followed Martínez-Ferrero
and García-Sánchez (2017).
6 The former is a test of second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N (0, 1) under the null
hypothesis that there is no serial correlation of the error terms; the sec-
ond is a test of the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the
GMM estimator, asymptotically distributed as chi2, under the null
hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid.
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